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Moral particularism, as it figures in the past few decades of moral philosophy, 
is not a single sharply defined position, but a family of views, united by an 
opposition to giving moral principles any fundamental role in morality.1 As 
such,  particularism challenges  the project  of ambitious  moral  theory in the 
traditional style of Kant, Mill, and virtually every other major figure in the 
history of moral philosophy. Moral generalism is, likewise, a family of views, 
united by the thought that moral principles do play some fundamental role. 
This paper first distinguishes two central roles which moral principles 
have traditionally been asked to play in moral theory and three different forms 
which opposition to principles playing either of those roles has taken in recent 
literature.  It  then  surveys  some  of  the  leading  arguments  for  and  against 
thinking that principles play these central roles. 
1. Two Roles of Principles: Standards and Guides
What it means to deny that principles play some important role in morality 
depends on what a moral principle is. Some important features of principles 
seem clear. Principles by their very nature involve some kind of generality, 
and a specifically moral principle presumably must deploy a moral concept. If 
a  moral  principle  is  to  be  something  that  can  be  thought  about,  accepted, 
doubted, or denied, it must also be a proposition or at least expressible as one. 
1 The most prominent particularists are Jonathan Dancy and Mark Lance and Margaret 
Little; they often cite the work of Iris Murdoch and John McDowell as inspiration. Other 
philosophers who express sympathy towards particularism in some of their work include 
David McNaughton, Richard Holton, Anthony Price, Simon Kirchin, and Alan Thomas. 
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An account of what a moral principle is should not, however, require 
any  specific  normative  content.  For  instance,  consequentialists  and  non-
consequentialists  in  normative  ethics  can  all  be  generalists.  Philosophers 
otherwise as diverse as Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, 
Hare, and Rawls debate whether the morally right thing to do is what brings 
about the best outcome available, but agree that whatever the morally right 
thing to do may be, it can be captured in general principles. 
Nor should an account of what a moral principle is require any specific 
metaethical account of moral propositions or their subject matter. For instance, 
Mill, Moore, and Hare have significant differences regarding the semantics, 
metaphysics, and epistemology of morality. In semantics, for example, Hare 
holds the expressivist view that moral principles express general prescriptions 
or other non-cognitive attitudes (perhaps in a propositional  guise),  whereas 
Mill  and  Moore  hold  the  cognitivist  view that  moral  principles  are  in  the 
business of capturing general moral facts. But they all count as generalists in 
virtue of accepting some or other form of utilitarianism as the fundamental 
principle of morality. 
These  two points  illustrate  how the  generalism-particularism debate 
concerns the structure of morality more than its specific normative content or 
metaethical foundations.
Looking at  the roles which moral  theorists  have asked principles  to 
play in  morality provides  a grip on what the sort  of moral  principles  over 
which  generalists  and particularists  disagree  would  need to  be like.  Moral 
theories can be thought of as having both a theoretical and a practical function. 
First,  moral  theories,  like  theories  in  general,  aim  to  explain certain 
phenomena. Those who take morality seriously wish to understand not merely 
what things are morally right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, but 
also why they are so. Second, moral theories aim to guide action. Those who 
take morality seriously wish to figure out what things are right and wrong, 
beneficial and harmful, cruel and kind, before action, not only in hindsight.2 
2 These two roles that moral theories have been asked to play make different demands on 
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What generalists and particularists dispute is whether general principles serve 
any  fundamental  theoretical  or  practical  function  in  morality  beyond 
functioning merely as useful rules of thumb. Let us now consider these two 
roles in more detail.
Principles  might  play  an  important  theoretical  role  in  morality  by 
explaining why things have the moral features they do. These are not 'brute' 
facts:  the  moral  features  of  things  'result'  from other,  typically  non-moral,  
features; for instance, some wrong actions are wrong in virtue of involving 
lying, others because they cause pain, and so on.3 One thing that principles can 
claim to do is to provide a general connection between a given moral feature 
and the features or conditions in virtue of which things have it. To count as 
genuine  principles,  such  'standards'  for  the  correct  application  of  moral 
concepts must have modal and explanatory implications.4 
Genuine moral standards have modal implications because they must 
support counterfactual conditionals ('If P were the case, then Q would be the 
case'); moreover, at least fundamental or non-derivative principles are usually 
regarded as necessary,  not  contingent.  If  a claim like 'It  is  wrong to harm 
others' were correct merely as a summary of actual past harmings, it would not 
support the counterfactual 'If I were to harm another person, that would be 
wrong.' If the former claim were also a necessary moral principle, it would 
entail something logically yet stronger, namely that harming others is wrong in 
all possible worlds.
Some moral claims which have the requisite modal character can be 
accepted  on  all  hands.  If  'murder'  were  defined  or  analyzed  as  'wrongful 
killing,' then 'Murder is wrong' would be a trivial analytic truth which no one, 
particularists  included,  need deny.5 Similarly,  some necessary moral  truths, 
moral claims. It is therefore possible that no moral claim, principle or otherwise, succeeds 
in playing both roles. Some philosophers deny that an adequate moral theory must be 
action-guiding.
3 Dancy (1993: 74; 2004: 85-7) notes that particularists agree. The general idea that moral 
facts hold in virtue of other facts is discussed in Strandberg (2008) and Väyrynen (2009a).
4 The term 'standard' is due to McKeever and Ridge (2006: 7).
5 Compare such standard examples of putative analytic truths as 'Bachelors are eligible 
unmarried adult males' or 'Nothing is both red all over and green all over.'
3
such as 'Any action that is not permissible is wrong,' are uninformative and not 
material  for  an  interesting  debate.  But  the  generalism-particularism debate 
should leave it open whether some moral truths might be substantive and yet 
analytic. Particularists would protest if told that some such principle as Kant's 
fundamental  Categorical  Imperative  is  true,  irrespective  of whether  it  were 
held to be an analytic truth. Similar neutrality applies to the epistemic status of 
principles. Many (though not all) generalists and particularists agree that basic 
moral  knowledge  is  a  priori.  That  would  explain  how we can have  moral 
knowledge  of  hypothetical  cases  and  come to  know whether  what  we are 
considering doing is right or wrong before doing it.6 But particularists would 
protest  if  told  that  some  such  principle  as  the  principle  of  utility  is  true, 
irrespective of whether it were held to be knowable a priori.
Other moral claims which have the requisite modal character fail to be 
explanatory. Consider the widely accepted claim that the moral 'supervenes' on 
the non-moral.7 This  is  to say that  no two objects can differ in any moral 
respect without some non-moral difference between the objects or the broader 
world(s) they inhabit.  Assume that moral nihilism is false: some things are 
right and wrong, good and bad, and so on. And take a right action and an 
exhaustive description of the world in which it occurs (including the action 
itself).  On  these  assumptions,  supervenience  entails  that,  necessarily,  any 
action that is just  like this  one is also right.  Particularists  need not oppose 
necessary 'supervenience functions' of this sort. An exhaustive description of a 
right act will include many facts which are irrelevant to whether it is right, 
such as having been done east of Hollywood. (Such a description may also be 
too complex to be a possible object of thought to cognitively limited humans). 
By  contrast,  a  genuine  principle  should  refer  only  to  features  which  are 
directly relevant to whether the moral feature in question obtains.8 
6 Among particularists, Dancy holds the idiosyncratic view that basic moral knowledge is 
contingent a priori (2004: 146-8; for discussion, see McKeever and Ridge 2006: 159-69).
7 A good introduction to the topic of supervenience is McLaughlin and Bennett (2008). 
8 Discussions of supervenience in the context of particularism include Dancy (1993: 73-8; 
2004: 86-9), Jackson, Pettit, and Smith (2000), Little (2000), McKeever and Ridge (2006: 
7-8), and Strandberg (2008). See also Väyrynen (2009a: 298-9). 
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Principles understood as standards come in two kinds, corresponding 
to a distinction between 'contributory' and 'overall' moral claims.9 Some moral 
claims  concern  a  contribution  of  some  factor  to  the  moral  character  of  a 
particular  action  or  situation,  whereas  others  express  an  overall  moral 
assessment which is a function of all the various contributions. A principle 
may advance either sort of claim. Claims about moral reasons, as claims about 
what considerations count in favor or against what actions or attitudes, are one 
example of contributory claims.  Another  are  pro tanto moral  claims  to  the 
effect that something is right or wrong, or good or bad, or what one has reason 
to do or not do, so far as its being of a particular kind goes (promise-keeping, 
truth-telling, killing, ...).  A prominent example of pro tanto moral claims are 
what  W.  D.  Ross  calls  'prima  facie'  duties.10 This  distinction  is  required 
because individual contributory claims rarely determine what one ought to do 
all  things  considered.  Reasons  can  be  opposed  (most  things  have  some 
features  that  count  in  their  favor  but  others  that  count  against  them)  and 
outweighed (considerations on one side are stronger than those on the other). 
Overall moral assessment is determined jointly by the various morally 
relevant factors. The way such factors combine in different contexts to do this 
is clearly quite complex. Consider, as but one example, conflicts between the 
duty to keep one's promises and the duty to help others. Sometimes, when a 
promise is trivial but the potential benefits to others are great, the right thing to 
do overall may be to break the promise. But sometimes, when a lot is at stake 
in the promise but the potential benefits to others are minor, the right thing to 
do overall may be to keep the promise. In either case, the balance of reasons 
may shift yet again depending on whether any further morally relevant factors 
are in play and their importance. This may not happen in any straightforwardly 
9 Dancy (2004: Ch. 2-4) explains well both the distinction between the contributory and the 
overall and problems with various attempts to analyze the former in terms of the latter. 
10 See Ross (1930: Ch. 2). He grants that 'prima facie duty' is a misleading label insofar as it 
suggests an epistemic notion (such as 'what at first appears to be a duty'). He means moral 
considerations which do not simply vanish if they are outweighed by other, stronger 
considerations, but remain in force (and may ground residual duties of compensation, 
regret, and the like). This is how 'pro tanto,' as explained in the text, is to be understood. 
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additive fashion.11
Contributory and overall principles play importantly different roles in 
the generalism-particularism debate. Many otherwise different classical moral 
theorists – Bentham, Mill, and Kant alike – agree that it is possible to spell out 
what one ought to do all things considered in general principles, despite all the 
complexity in how such facts are determined. Others, such as Ross and his 
plurality  of  'prima  facie'  duties,  argue  that  while  it  is  to  possible  specify 
principles  determining  how individual  non-moral  features  of  circumstances 
contribute  to  their  overall  moral  nature,  the  way these contributory factors 
combine  to  determine  overall  moral  assessment  is  much  too  complex  and 
sensitive to context to be captured by anything worth calling principles. 
In contrast to both camps, contemporary particularists argue that the 
ways in which the non-moral features of particular circumstances combine to 
make something morally relevant in the first place and determine its valence 
as morally positive or negative (and not merely to determine its weight relative 
to other relevant factors) is too complex and sensitive to context to be captured 
even in principles concerning how morality works at the contributory level, let 
alone  in  principles  concerning  how it  works  at  the  level  of  overall  moral 
assessment.  This  argument  will  be  discussed  below as  the  'argument  from 
holism.' The point for now is that debates about whether there are overall or 
merely  contributory  principles  are  typically  classified  as  family  disputes 
within  generalism,  whereas  particularists  are  united  by  their  opposition  to 
principles of both kinds.12 
Turning now to the  practical  function  of  morality,  principles  might 
play an important practical role by providing guidance for moral reasoning, 
decision, and action in the face of moral novelty, uncertainty, and difficulty. A 
principle counts as a valuable 'guide'  if people – or, at  least,  conscientious 
moral agents who care about living up to the demands of morality – can more 
reliably  act  in  morally  valuable  ways  and  avoid  immoral  actions  with  its 
11 Kagan (1988) and Dancy (2000). See also Berker (2007).
12 Dancy (1993; 2004) and Little (2000).
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assistance than without it.13 A reliable guide for 'acting well' in this sense need 
not be an 'algorithmic' decision procedure which will achieve this goal without 
fail  and can  be  applied  to  particular  cases  without  any further  exercise  of 
judgment.14 Judgment is necessary (though fallible) even in the application of 
both the moral and non-moral concepts which figure in principles. (To use a 
famous example by H. L. A. Hart, does a war-memorial statue of a Jeep count 
as  a  'vehicle'  with  respect  to  the  rule  'No  vehicles  in  the  park'?)  This  is 
especially clear with principles that require varied implementation in different 
cases (such as 'Teachers should set work which is adjusted to each student's 
level of ability').15 As we will see, particularists nonetheless argue that, even 
allowing the need for judgment, relying on principles in deliberation is often a 
hindrance to acting well.
Particularists'  opposition  to  moral  principles  does  not  extend  to 
everything one could decide to call  a principle.  They can accept  principles 
understood as  rules  of  thumb or  other  heuristic  aides  for  deliberation.  For 
instance, they can grant that how past situations have turned out morally could 
be summarized in true generalizations which may be useful as one input to 
future  deliberations.  Such  summary  generalizations  will  lack  the  requisite 
modal and explanatory implications. They are also in principle dispensable in 
deliberation. Hence they make no claim to play a fundamental theoretical or 
practical role. 
2. Three Forms of Particularism
We have seen that particularism is defined by opposition to general principles 
concerning the contributory and the overall. There are three main forms which 
opposition to principles – whether as theoretical standards, practical guides, or 
both – may take within an anti-nihilist agreement that some substantive moral 
claims are correct and knowable. One is that there are no true or valid moral 
13 McKeever and Ridge (2006: Ch. 9) and Väyrynen (2008).
14 As McDowell (1979) emphasizes, and such generalists as O'Neill (1996), Crisp (2000), 
McKeever and Ridge (2006), and Väyrynen (2008) agree.
15 O'Neill (1996: 75). 
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principles. The second, an evidential  variant of the first,  is that there is  no 
good evidence for the existence of true or valid moral principles. 
The third option is that morality in no way depends on the existence of 
moral  principles.  A leading particularist,  Jonathan Dancy,  puts this  idea as 
follows: 'The possibility of moral thought and judgment do not depend upon 
the  provision  of  a  suitable  supply  of  moral  principles.'16 This  position  is 
logically weaker than the first two: it can allow that morality displays some 
patterns that can be captured in principles, while denying that morality must 
be so or that anything in morality hangs on it.
In the course of the debate, some particularists have moved towards the 
third  form of  particularism.17 What  exactly  it  says  turns  on  what  kind  of 
relation of dependence is at issue and what 'moral thought and judgment' is 
taken to cover.18 Many generalists allow that there can be moral agents who do 
not  accept  or  even  implicitly  rely  on  moral  principles,  just  as  many 
particularists allow that some agents (however mistakenly) follow principles. 
What these generalists would claim is not that such agents are incapable of 
engaging in moral thought and judgment, but that they are unlikely to get their 
moral judgments reliably right. 
The third position counts as a form of particularism about standards so 
long as it denies that particular moral facts depend for their existence, or moral 
judgments  for  their  correctness,  on  principles.  And it  counts  as  a  form of 
particularism about guides so long as it denies that reliable moral guidance or 
the practical accessibility of moral truths depends on principles. These claims 
do not require that the very conditions of moral thought and judgment depend 
on principles.  But if they are correct,  principles will  still  have a hard time 
playing any fundamental role in explaining, or guiding us to, particular moral 
facts. 
16 Dancy (2004: 7).
17 Compare, for instance, the positions defended in Dancy (1993) and Dancy (2004).
18 McKeever and Ridge (2006) and  Väyrynen (2006). 
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3. Arguments for and against Particularism
Let  us  now  review  some  main  arguments  that  have  been  offered  for  and 
against moral particularism, beginning with the theoretical role of principles. 
Consider first those particularists who claim that there are no true principles or 
no good evidence for their existence. Generalists could settle their debate with 
those particularists in one of two ways. 
One strategy is to try to establish some specific moral principle. But 
this strategy is not likely to provide a distinctive or swift resolution to debates 
about  particularism.  Historical  and  contemporary  normative  ethics  already 
contain ample discussion of the merits of various specific principles. To any 
particular  candidate,  a particularist  could reply that the spirit  of generalism 
requires a supply of principles to cover the whole of morality. So establishing 
one specific principle helps the generalist cause only if it is an overarching 
overall principle like the principle of utility or Kant's Categorical Imperative. 
But one thing that the long-standing debates in normative ethics have made 
clear is that although any overarching overall principle which purports to be 
substantive and explanatory will be highly controversial, such principles also 
often prove to be resourceful in dealing with putative counterexamples. 
A different strategy is to pursue some general considerations which are 
relevant to the role of principles in morality, whatever their specific content. 
Some argue that  morality  requires  some principles,  whatever  their  specific 
content, on the basis of metaethical claims to the effect that competence with 
moral concepts, and therefore their deployment in genuine moral judgments, 
requires at  least  an implicit  or tacit  grasp of some moral  principles.19 This 
implies that there are some explanatory principles which are conceptual truths, 
even if it is difficult to work out what they are or we are incompetent in doing 
so.  Hence its  plausibility  depends on the prospects  for  substantive  and yet 
conceptual  moral  truths  (to  which  generalism  as  such  has  no  particular 
commitment, as noted earlier), its response to G. E. Moore's 'Open Question 
19 Jackson, Pettit, and Smith (2000), as well as Peacocke (2004). 
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Argument,'20 and more. 
The  most  prominent  argument  for  particularism  also  appeals  to  a 
general claim that bears on the role of principles in morality. This is known as 
the argument from 'holism.' The holism at issue concerns an important kind of 
context-sensitivity of morality, and reasons for action generally, which bears 
on  the  theoretical  role  of  principles  in  explaining  particular  moral  facts. 
According to holism about reasons for action, a consideration that is a reason 
to φ in one set of circumstances may be no reason at all, or a even a reason not 
to φ, in a some different set  of circumstances.  Contrary to 'atomism'  about 
reasons, it is not part of what it is to be a reason for action that if something is 
a reason to φ in a particular context, then it is a reason to φ in every other 
context.21 Analogous holisms can be formulated for other contributory notions, 
such as right-making and good-making factors. One example is that although 
actions which cause pleasure are often the better for it,  they are in no way 
better  when they bring pleasure to  a  sadist  delighting  in  his  victim's  pain; 
another  is  that  even if  the fact  that  I  promised to  do something is  often a 
reason to do it, that fact may be no reason at all when the promise was given 
under duress or fraud.22 Particularists  argue that  if  reasons are contextually 
variable in the way that holism implies, then general principles are too blunt 
an instrument to capture their behavior across contexts. Generalists have taken 
issue with this argument with respect both to its soundness, contesting holism, 
and to its validity. 
Some generalists argue that holism is false because morality is based 
on  some  factors  which  are  or  generate  invariable  reasons.  Perhaps,  for 
instance,  morality  is  based  on  virtues  and  vices,  and  these  give  rise  to 
invariable reasons. The idea would be that whether an action is right or good is 
determined  by whether  it  is  generous,  courageous,  just,  and so  on,  and if 
20 Moore (1903/1993). Very roughly, the Open Question Argument aims to show that no 
substantive moral claims are true merely in virtue of their meaning.
21 Holism can allow that some considerations may be invariable reasons, so long as they are 
so not qua reasons but because of idiosyncratic features, such as their particular content.
22 A large selection of such examples can be found in Dancy (1993, 2000) and Little (2000).
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something is generous,  courageous, just, and so on, that is invariably a reason 
to do it. This view can grant to holists that considerations such as lying might 
have  variable  moral  import;  perhaps  not  all  lies  need  involve  dishonesty, 
which is the real and invariable reason why lying is wrong, when it is.23 In 
reply,  some particularists deny that specific virtues and vices are invariably 
relevant in the same way (perhaps actions can sometimes be worse for being 
honest  or  considerate),  whereas  others  limit  holism  to  non-moral 
considerations.24
Other  arguments  against  holism  target  the  distinction  that  holism 
requires between considerations that are reasons (e.g.,  that I promised)  and 
other features of the broader context which can be relevant to whether some 
consideration is a reason without themselves being reasons. Reasons are thus 
distinguished from 'defeaters,' whose presence makes something that would in 
their absence have been a reason not be one (perhaps, for example, that my 
promise  was  given  under  duress),  and  from 'enablers,'  whose  presence  is 
required to make something that would in their absence not have been a reason 
be one (such as that what I promised to do is itself morally permissible).25 
Reasons can be variable in the way holism requires only if they depend on 
further background conditions which may vary by context. 
Some generalists  object  that  the  examples  in  support  of  holism are 
ineffective because they specify reasons incompletely. Full reasons for action 
include  the  background  conditions  which  holism classifies  as  defeaters  or 
enablers.26 Thus  the  reason  for  me  to  fix  your  bike  is  not  simply  that  I 
promised; it is that I made an uncoerced and informed promise to fix your 
bike, and fixing your bike is not itself morally impermissible, and so on for 
any other relevant features of the background context. If reasons are composed 
in this inclusive way, it becomes less plausible that what is a reason in one 
23 Crisp (2000) and McNaughton and Rawling (2000).
24 Dancy (2004: 121-2) vs. McNaughton and Rawling (2000). See also Little (2000).
25 On these distinctions, see Dancy (2001, 2004: Ch. 3). Reasons, defeaters, and enablers can 
further be distinguished from 'intensifiers' and 'diminishers' (or 'attenuators'), which can 
make a reason stronger or weaker in strength than it would otherwise have been.
26 Stratton-Lake (2000), Hooker (2000; 2008), and Raz (2000; 2006).
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context  may be no reason at  all  or  even an opposite  reason in  a  different 
context. But this debate fast becomes difficult to track, because both sides rely 
on different judgments about what exactly is the reason in a particular case in 
the first place; hence the debate cannot be settled by examples alone.27 Those 
judgments may also be unreliable in predictable ways, and hence a poor basis 
for arguments either way.28 
Other generalists object to a claim which some particularists associate 
with holism, namely that  any consideration whatever can be a reason, given 
suitable  circumstances.29 This  threatens  to  'flatten  the  moral  landscape'  by 
jettisoning  the  strong intuition  that  considerations  like  killing,  infliction  of 
pain,  and  truth-telling  have  a  greater  and  deeper  moral  import  than 
considerations like shoelace color or hair parting. Some particularists seek to 
capture this  difference by arguing that some considerations, 'default' reasons, 
need no enablers and hence are reasons unless some defeater prevents them 
from being so, whereas others, 'non-default'  reasons, are not reasons unless 
enabled by some features of the context.30 Issues in this debate include which 
of the various possible notions of a default reason (e.g., pragmatic, epistemic, 
and metaphysical) particularism needs, which of these notions are plausible, 
and whether  particularism offers  the  best  account  of  any plausible  default 
reasons that there might be.31
A different  response  to  the  argument  from holism is  to  argue  that 
holism  is  compatible  with  generalism  and  hence  does  not  support 
particularism even if true. A common claim here is that principles concerning 
moral  reasons  can  incorporate  as  part  of  their  content  the  very  contextual 
variability  of  reasons  which  follows  from  holism.32 Principles  can  make 
27 McNaughton and Rawling (2000) and Väyrynen (2006).
28 Schroeder (forthcoming). 
29 Dancy (1993), Little (2000), and Cullity (2002). Holism alone does not yield this view, for 
reasons might be context-dependent without being determined solely by features of 
context.
30 Dancy (1993: 26, 103; 2004: 111-17) and Lance and Little (2006a). 
31 Väyrynen (2004), McKeever and Ridge (2006: Ch. 3), and Horty (2007). 
32 Jackson, Pettit, and Smith (2000), Väyrynen (2004; 2006), McKeever and Ridge (2005; 
2006: Ch. 2).
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reference not only to features which provide reasons but also, in some or other 
fashion, to contextual features like defeaters and enablers. For instance, one 
could endorse a principle like 'Necessarily, that an action promotes pleasure is 
a reason to do it, unless the pleasure is sadistic.' This specifies the fact that an 
action promotes pleasure as a reason for doing it and the condition that the 
pleasure is not sadistic as something which must obtain in any particular case 
in order for the fact that an action promotes pleasure to be a reason to do it.
One  particularist  reply  to  this  objection  is  that  the  argument  from 
holism  is  indirect.  Although  holism  is  compatible  with  generalism, 
particularism provides a better explanation of holism. Given holism, it would 
be a mere 'cosmic accident,' rather than anything supporting the dependence of 
morality on principles, if reasons behaved in a way that can be captured in 
general  principles.33 How  exactly  such  an  indirect  argument  is  to  be 
understood is a complicated issue.34 Some generalists offer accounts of moral 
principles according to which the best overall explanation of particular moral 
facts  under  holism  still  relies  on  principles.35 Others  argue,  on  more 
epistemological grounds, that the way in which enablers, defeaters and all the 
other  distinctions  and  complications  on  which  holism  insists  work  out  in 
reasoning can in fact be predicted and explained by general and independently 
plausible principles.36 
The  force  of  these  objections  to  the  validity  of  the  argument  from 
holism depends less on the extent to which morality is context-sensitive than 
on what exactly is required by all the other conditions for being a principle. 
Thus  an  increasingly  active  topic  of  discussion  has  been  whether  general 
principles can capture all the context-sensitivity which they must capture to 
accommodate holism and still retain the requisite modal implications, count as 
appropriately explanatory of particular moral facts, and so on. 
The argument from holism remains a central  focus of debates about 
33 Little (2000: 277), Stratton-Lake (2000: 129), and Dancy (2004: 82).
34 McKeever and Ridge (2006: 32-41) and Leibowitz (2009).
35 Väyrynen (2006; 2009b). 
36 Horty (2007) and Schroeder (2009, forthcoming).
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particularism because  discussions  of  it  bear  on  a  wide  range  of  important 
further issues. One is whether genuine principles must hold without exception 
or  may include  some kind of  hedges.  Generalists  can  try to  accommodate 
holism in two different ways depending on this issue. 
One strategy is to pursue 'unhedged' principles which enumerate the 
potential  defeaters and enablers.  The idea is that it  is possible to specify a 
complete list of the requisite qualifications and exceptions, and thus to give at 
least  contributory  principles  which  hold  without  exception.37 An  example 
might be that the fact that one promised to do something will always be a 
reason  to  do  it,  provided  that  the  promise  was  informed  and  uncoerced, 
requires  nothing  morally  impermissible,  has  not  been  canceled  by  the 
promisee, and ___ (where the blank stands for all the further relevant features, 
whatever they may be).38 
The  success  of  this  strategy  requires  that  the  list  of  the  potential 
defeaters and enablers is finite. This claim has been defended by arguments 
from moral epistemology. One is that if knowledge of what is morally right 
and wrong in particular cases is possible (as particularists agree it is), then the 
idea that moral facts are not brute can be used to support generalism.39 If the 
moral features of things result from their other features (such as that they are 
cases of lying, killing, and so on), then moral knowledge in particular cases 
requires appropriate sensitivity to these underlying features. Under holism this 
requires sensitivity not only to considerations which are reasons but also to the 
absence of various potential defeaters and the presence of various enablers, 
defeaters  for  defeaters,  and the  like.  Unless  there were only finitely many 
factors  for  moral  standards  to  list  and for  us  to  check,  cognitively limited 
beings like us humans could not have moral knowledge, since we could not 
37 Ross (1930: Ch. 2), Gert (1998), McKeever and Ridge (2006: Ch. 7), and Hooker (2008).
38 Note that not all exceptionless generalizations count as genuine principles. Some are 
merely accidentally true and therefore lack the requisite modal implications. One example 
from outside morality would be 'All nuggets of gold are smaller than 1,000 cubic meters.'
39 This argument is due to McKeever and Ridge (2006: Ch. 6-7). For critical discussion, see 
Schroeder (2009) and Väyrynen (2009b).
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reliably judge whether various considerations  are  undefeated  reasons.40 But 
more  remains  to  be  said  about  why epistemological  considerations  should 
constrain the complexity of moral facts.  
A different strategy is to allow that the list of potential exceptions and 
qualifications might be open-ended and not fully specifiable,  but argue that 
general moral  claims which are hedged in some way need not thereby fall 
short  of  other  requirements  on  principles.41 To  be  sure,  certain  ways  of 
hedging principles do trivialize them. If 'Breaking promises is wrong, other 
things being equal' amounted merely to 'Breaking promises is wrong, except 
when it is not,' it could not explain when or why breaking promises is wrong. 
But many philosophers accept that the special sciences, such as biology and 
psychology, feature genuine laws which permit exceptions. Some argue that 
the same is true of morality:  such claims as 'In suitable conditions, lying is 
wrong'  or 'All  else  equal,  pain is  bad'  can state  principles  even if  there is 
nothing wrong with some lies or nothing bad about some instances of pain, so 
long as their hedge clauses can be given substantive content. This grants to 
particularists that substantive moral generalities may be subject to exceptions, 
but not that there are no genuine principles. 
The  success  of  this  strategy  requires  an  account  of  how  hedged 
principles can be explanatory if they permit exceptions and how grasping them 
can improve our reliability in detecting reasons, defeaters, enablers, and the 
like.  On this  score,  some take the 'unexceptional'  cases where pain is  bad, 
lying wrong, etc., as basic and argue that exceptions can then be explained in 
terms of deviations from them.42 But explanation might run deeper: just as the 
moral status of an action (as right or wrong, for instance) requires explanation 
40 There is a stronger claim in this vicinity, namely that the list of potential defeaters and 
enablers must be not only finite but also short enough that principles can exhaustively 
specify them all without becoming too complex to be possible objects of (human) thought. 
If principles failed to be cognitively manageable in this sense, generalism about standards 
might be epistemically irrelevant even if true. This alone would not be a problem for 
generalism about standards.
41 Pietroski (1993), Lance and Little (2006b; 2007), Robinson (2006), Väyrynen (2006; 
2009b). 
42 Lance and Little (2006a; b).
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in terms of its other features, why those other features contribute to its moral 
status as they do might  itself require explanation; these might  not be brute 
facts  either).  For  instance,  if  some  government  policy  is  bad  because  it 
increases  the  inequality  of  well-being,  perhaps  there  should  also  be  some 
explanation of why such inequality has negative moral significance in the first 
place. (One might sensibly wonder why inequality is not morally irrelevant 
instead.)  Such  an  explanation  might  well  turn  on  features  which  are  not 
manifested  by  all  instances  of  inequality.  For  instance,  perhaps  unequal 
distributions of well-being are bad when and because of some such deeper 
moral flaws as that they are unfair or not to everyone's benefit. Exceptional 
cases might then be explained in the same stroke by the absence of the very 
same  features  whose  presence  explains  why inequality  is  bad,  when  it  is. 
Perhaps inequality as such is not bad when those who have less are worse off 
through a fault  or choice of their  own (in which case the inequality is  not 
unfair) or when it makes everyone better off than they would otherwise be. 
Some  generalists  argue  that  the  best  account  of  this  kind  of  explanation 
delivers principles which incorporate the common explanatory basis of both 
moral reasons and their enabling and defeating conditions.43 More remains to 
be  said  here  as  well.  For  instance,  how the  notion  of  explanation  is  best 
understood in ethics remains controversial.44 
Let us now turn to arguments concerning principles in their practical 
role as guides. Some of these are corollaries of theoretical considerations such 
as the argument from holism. If moral reasons were context-sensitive in some 
way that  principles  cannot  capture,  then relying  on principles  for guidance 
might be more likely than not to make agents go morally astray. It might, for 
instance, encourage the thought that if a consideration was a reason to φ in one 
case, then it will  be a reason to φ in others, whereas if holism is true,  the 
consideration  can make  a  moral  difference  in  other  cases,  too,  but  is  not 
43 Väyrynen (2006; 2009b) and Robinson (2006) develop two different accounts of this kind.
44 Little (2000), McKeever and Ridge (2006), Väyrynen (2009a; b), and Leibowitz 
(forthcoming).
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guaranteed to matter.45
Generalism is, however, hurt by this argument only if it is incompatible 
with holism. A different worry is that even if principles can capture holism, 
they might be able to do so only by becoming too complex to be adequate 
guides.  But,  again,  the  roles  of  principles  as  standards  and  as  guides  are 
distinct.46 A rule that is too simple to be accurate and explanatory with respect 
to all actual and possible cases in its scope might still  be a valuable guide 
precisely if it oversimplifies in useful ways, even if it also sometimes leads to 
error.47 For instance, 'Killing is wrong' can be a reliable heuristic guide in the 
actual world even if what is fundamentally wrong with killing is some more 
specific  feature  not  possessed by all  killings  and even if  most  killings  are 
permissible in hypothetical Mad Max worlds. 
Other  particularist  arguments  are  more  directly  practical.  Some 
particularists claim that relying on principles tends to direct our attention only 
to the features which already figure in our principles and we may thus miss 
morally relevant features which we would have noticed, had we only given the 
details and nuances of the particular case the kind of attentive examination 
which particularists think can be sufficient for reliably acting well.  So they 
claim  that,  at  least  in  imperfect  humans,  relying  on  principles  instead  of 
cultivating the kind of moral sensitivity that marks the virtuous person easily 
breeds  moral  laziness,  rigidity,  or  narrow-mindedness.  They  recommend 
'principle abstinence' as an antidote.48 
Some generalists respond that principles are more useful than anything 
particularism  offers  in  ensuring  the  benefits  of  interpersonal  assurance, 
coordination, and the like.49 Others respond, more directly to the point of the 
objection, that principles may be able to provide reliable guidance even if their 
45 The truth of holism would also complicate the use of hypothetical cases like the trolley 
problems in normative ethics, since one might not be able to generalize widely from them.
46 Similarly, the content of the correct moral standards need not depend on contingent facts 
about human psychology in the way that what counts as a valuable guide so depends.
47 Sunstein (2005), McKeever and Ridge (2006: 8-9), and Väyrynen (2008).
48 McNaughton (1988: 62, 190-3), Dancy (1993: 64, 67), and perhaps McDowell (1979).
49 Hooker (2000; 2008).
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guidance  is  fallible  and  does  not  take  the  form  of  a  rigid  check-list  of 
considerations. Generalists can agree that the kinds of sensitivity to reasons 
and  skill  of  judgment  on  which  particularists  insist  is  necessary  (though 
perhaps  not  sufficient)  for  acting  well,  and  they  can  accommodate  the 
evidence from cognitive science that people's moral decisions are often not 
consciously based on principles.50 Acceptance of principles might instead be 
best understood as informing and shaping one's responsiveness to reasons and 
bringing with  it  a  commitment  to  further  cultivating  moral  sensitivity  and 
judgment. 
One challenge to particularists is to explain how we are able to learn 
from moral experience, as we plainly are, if not by coming to grasp generally 
applicable  principles.  The  typical  reply  is  that  experience  can  inform  our 
judgments in new cases by telling us what sorts of features  can be morally 
relevant and what sort of relevance these various features can have in different 
cases. But getting from such information to accurate judgments of particular 
cases would seem to be quite complicated under particularism. So the worry 
arises whether particularists can offer valuable guidance to that multitude of us 
who are still trying to refine our moral sensitivities and judgment and advance 
on our path towards practical wisdom.
Particularists regard describing someone as 'a person of principle'  as 
criticism, not praise. But relying on principles which are more than mere rules 
of  thumb  for  guidance  need  not  mean  dogmatism,  rigidity,  or  narrow-
mindedness.  As a  view about  the  structure  of  morality,  generalism has  no 
commitment to any particular substantive view about the content of the correct 
moral principles. Thus it need not recommend people to adhere dogmatically 
to the principles they accept. 
Fundamentalists and fanatics aside, many people are uncertain about at 
least some of the moral views they hold and regard some others as capable of 
refinement  and  improvement.  Generalists  no  less  than  particularists  can 
acknowledge that our actual moral outlooks are works in progress and that 
50 McKeever and Ridge (2006: Ch. 9) and Väyrynen (2008). See also Dworkin (1995).
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resolving  uncertainty,  error,  and  disagreements  about  particular  moral 
principles requires thinking hard about a wide range of notoriously difficult 
and  controversial  concrete  moral  problems.  Both  can  agree  that  the  best 
remedy for poor moral judgment is better moral judgment. But as with sex 
education, so with moral principles: teaching abstinence may well not be the 
best policy. 
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